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ABSTRACT
This paper begins with the assumption that the concept of risk implies an entanglement 
between facts and values. This is not an arbitrary assumption since it can directly be de-
duced from the standard notion of risk. The value-ladenness of risk raises at least two fur-
ther issues: the first one concerns the scales adopted to evaluate the severity of risks; the 
second concerns the commensurability/comparability of risks to human health and the envi-
ronment. Some additional light is shed on those issues by asking what would happen if the 
models used in risk analysis were understood as fictions limited by the values that they can 
include. From this point of view, controversies on the limited scope of standard risk assess-
ments are not only descriptive but also evaluative.
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Philosophical issues related 
to risks and values
Renato Rodrigues Kinouchi1
Are risks value-free?
Risk is a polysemic word usually associated with the general idea of danger, harm or loss re-
sulting from a ions whose consequences cannot be completely foreseen. Its etymology is uncer-
tain because similar words can be traced back to Greek, Latin and Arabic, but there is enough evi-
dence on its Mediterranean origin and its  ecific relatedness with maritime voyage hazards such 
as strong storms, hidden reefs, pirate attacks, etc. (Knutsen et al., 2012). This ancient nautical 
slang was incorporated into economic and legal jargon with the rise of merchant capitalism and 
the increasing demand for maritime commerce insurance2. Today the word risk is employed in 
multifarious theoretical and pra ical contexts – for instance, statistics, decision theory, finance, 
medicine, engineering, ecology, climatology, sociology, etc. – which contributes to the plurality 
of its meanings. 
In order to address the initial question, it is necessary to begin with one of the available 
definitions of risk, and it seems reasonable to choose the standard technical definition usually 
adopted by risk analysts: risk is the expectation value of an unwanted event defined as the product 
of the probability of the event – expressed as a number within the interval [0, 1] – by a quanti-
tative estimate of its severity – that is, the magnitude of the harm (cf. Hansson, 2013, p. 9-10). 
It is important to note that, according to such definition, risk varies as a function of both the 
probability of the event and the amount of damage it may cause. For instance, supposing the 
probability of an earthquake in Alaska and in California were the same, the latter would pose a 
higher risk due to the significant difference in both the material losses and the number of people 
potentially affected. Thus, even for this technical definition, risk cannot be value-free since one 
of the equation terms must imply some measure of a value (human lives, material goods, etc.) 
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under risk. The philosopher Sven Hansson (2004, 2005, 2009, 
2012, 2013) has often emphasized that “risk always refers to 
the possibility that something undesirable will happen. Due 
to this component of undesirability, the notion of risk is val-
ue-laden” (Hansson, 2013, p. 10). 
Such value-ladenness does not mean, however, that risk 
is then a fact-free concept grounded exclusively upon human 
value judgements. Risk assessments may be seen as socially 
constructed in the same trivial sense that any human inqui-
ry depends on social cooperation, linguistic conventions, etc., 
but,  although it is true that people actually have very differ-
ent risk perceptions about, say, earthquakes, it is beyond any 
reasonable doubt that strong seismic events are really much 
more frequent along the boundaries of tectonic plates, which 
in turn justifies investments in building design, evacuation 
alarm systems and other socially constructed safety mecha-
nisms in cities located near geological faults. For Hansson,       
In this way, risk is both fact-laden and val-
ue-laden […] A notion of risk that connects 
in a reasonable way to the conditions of hu-
man life will have to accommodate both its 
fact-ladenness and its value-ladenness. The 
real challenge is to disentangle the facts 
and the values sufficiently from each other 
to make well-informed and well-ordered de-
cision processes possible (Hansson, 2013, 
p. 11).
 
The fact-value distinction played an important role in 
early philosophical works on risk analysis since it made possi-
ble to detect hidden value assumptions usually overlooked by 
scientists, engineers and risk analysts.3 More recently, Möller 
(2012) reframed this issue by considering the concept of risk 
as a thick ethical concept. Thick ethical concepts are concepts 
that have both descriptive and evaluative contents such as, say, 
“cruel”, “brave” and “selfish” (cf. Williams, 2006). These con-
cepts are hardly reducible to thin ethical concepts like “right” or 
“bad” because they exhibit descriptive features absent in the 
latter. As an illustration, to say that a certain person is self-
ish does not only mean he or she behaves badly but denotes 
a  ecific way he or she gives priority to himself or herself 
over others. Thick concepts, in short, belong to a grey zone 
where descriptive and evaluative a ects, related to a given 
state of affairs, merge into each other. According to Möller, 
“that something is safe is a positive feature of the entity, and 
that something carries a risk is a negative feature of it. But it 
is not simply positive or negative, it is positive or negative in 
a certain way; it has certain descriptive shape” (Möller, 2012, 
p. 75, original italics). 
For Möller, risk should be considered a thick concept 
since to affirm that the situation S is risky involves both a 
descriptive dimension about the potentially harmful event, 
which amounts to the likelihood of S coming about (e.g., the 
probability of an earthquake and the estimated distance of its 
epicenter from highly populated areas), and an evaluative di-
mension related to a precise forecast of its severity (e.g., the 
number of residents probably affected, the existence of chem-
ical industries or nuclear plants in the area). This thickness 
of risk involves a functional distinction less committed to the 
ontological assumptions present in the traditional dichotomy 
judgements of facts versus values judgements. Importantly, 
Möller reframed the discussion with an approach resistant 
to reductionist views: “there is an essential interdependence 
between the natural-descriptive a ects and the normative 
a ects [...] The output of recent moral philosophy is skepti-
cism of the reductive claim for thick concepts such as risk and 
safety” (Möller, 2012, p. 76). 
Risks and value comparisons
What is the role played by values in risk analysis? If 
we begin with the preliminary question “what are values?”, 
the usual answer includes a huge variety of desirable things 
worthy of pursuance by human beings, from personal needs, 
wants and pleasures to more objective goods such as health, 
wealth and, above all, the preservation of our own lives. The 
field of axiology, understood in a broad sense, includes a 
constellation of further questions such as “what is the nature 
of values?”, “are values subjective or objective?”, “are there in-
trinsic values?”, “can values be compared?”, and so on. The 
last question, about value comparisons, is decisive to clarify 
how risk analysts measure and compare the severities of po-
tential harms.
In standard risk assessments, the quantity of deaths 
(casualties) is a widespread evaluative measure of severity. 
In order to calculate the expectation value of a risk, each life 
is valued the same and therefore can be arithmetically add-
ed to other lives, making it possible to construct an interval 
scale where positive integers (1, 2, 3, …, n) define degrees of 
severity. So, the value of life is disposed into an interval scale 
because “for the expected value of harm to be well defined [...] 
we must be able to decide not only that harm A is more severe 
than B, and that B is more severe than C, but also the relative 
severity between them” (Möller, 2012, p. 63). In other words, 
if each life is valued the same, then it is possible to say that 
“five deaths are five times worse than one death”. More impor-
tantly, this assumption takes for granted value commensura-
bility: casualties become a cardinal unit to measure severity. 
One may say that risk analysis cannot rely only on such 
quantitative measure. Suppose a risk that does not cause 
death but instead leads to limb amputation. For this case, is 
losing one leg equal to losing one arm? If so, is losing two legs 
twice worse than losing one arm? In short, is it reasonable to 
3 According to Hansson, works such as Thomson (1985), MacLean (1986), Shrader-Frechette (1991) and Cranor (1997) had as their “main 
purpose to expose the value-dependence of allegedly value-free risk assessments” (Hansson, 2012, p. 29).
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measure the severity of limb amputation by an interval scale? 
One may say that the (dis)value of limb amputation depends 
on personal preferences: for example, for Admiral Nelson 
the lack of an arm was not significant for the victory in the 
Battle of Trafalgar, but probably a naval officer without a leg 
would be very much limited in his ability to command (due 
to ship instabilities, decks with lot of stairs, etc.); on the oth-
er hand, for the aviator Captain Douglas Badler, the lack of 
both legs did not jeopardise his performance in the Battle of 
Dunkirk, but he would hardly be a fighter ace without an arm. 
Although it does not sound reasonable to propose an interval 
scale to measure the severity of limb amputations, severity 
may be comparable by ordinal scales of preference: for Admi-
ral Nelson, a leg was more valuable than an arm; for Captain 
Badler, an arm was more valuable than a leg.
The value-ladenness of risk involves the issue of com-
mensurability/comparability of the unwanted outcomes. 
According to Ruh Chang, “two items are incommensurable 
just in case they cannot be put on the same scale of units of 
value, that is, there is no cardinal unit of measure that can 
represent the value of both items” (Chang, 2015, p. 205). 
As to incomparability, “two items are incomparable just in 
case they fail to stand in an evaluative comparative relation, 
such as being better than or worse than or equally as good as 
the other” (Chang, 2015, p. 205). From a logical point of view, 
incomparability entails incommensurability but the reverse 
does not hold. In what  ecifically regards risks, Nicolas Espi-
noza describes those relations in the following way:    
I shall say that two risks are evaluatively in-
commensurable if and only if there is no car-
dinal scale with respect to which the severity 
of both risks can be compared. In addition, 
two risks are evaluatively incomparable if and 
only if it is not the case that they can be or-
dinally ranked, which is to say that is not the 
case that one risk is better, worse or equally 
as good as the other. Note that incommen-
surability thus defined does not necessarily 
imply incomparability; the failure to compare 
two risks cardinally, for instance the failure 
to say that risk A is, say, three times more 
severe than B, does not automatically imply 
that we cannot say that risk A is more severe 
than risk B. It may be helpful to view the dis-
tinction between incommensurability and 
incomparability, namely that between or-
dinal and cardinal measurement, as analo-
gous to the distinction between quantitative 
and qualitative comparison (Espinoza, 2009, 
p. 129, emphasis mine).
 
In order to point out a problem concerning risk com-
parisons, let’s denominate as cardinalizable those values which 
can be arranged into interval scales (e.g. cardinal utility, mon-
ey, number of casualties, etc.), and let’s denominate as ordinal-
izable those values which can be arranged into ordinal scales 
(e.g. ordinal utility, preferences, rankings). This distinction is 
usual in statistics, economics and related disciplines: for in-
stance, the notion of cardinal utility has a long history going 
back to Bentham and it was further developed by neoclassical 
economists and by Von Neumann and Morgenstern; regard-
ing the notion of ordinal utility, it is widely used by contem-
porary economists and Bayesian statisticians. 
Nevertheless, there is a background question on wheth-
er every value can be adequately disposed into interval or or-
dinal scales. There is no impediment to suppose that certain 
values could not be arranged into any type of scale, resulting 
in their incomparability. For example, there are discussions 
about value incomparability in ethical debates concerning in-
compensable harms4 (e.g. Thomson, 1986; Shrader-Frechette, 
1991) and in empirical studies on the so-called protected val-
ues5 (e.g. Baron and Spranca, 1997; Tetlock et al., 2000). As a 
matter of fact, “some people think that some of their values 
are protected from trade-offs with other values” and they 
hold those values “as possessing infinite or transcendental 
significance that precludes comparisons, trade-offs, or indeed 
any other mingling with bounded or secular values” (Espino-
za, 2009, p. 130-131). And in addition, “laypersons often feel 
that it is unethical to assign monetary prices to risk imposed 
upon humans or the environment” (Espinoza, 2009, p. 130). 
This issue embarrasses the method of cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA), which tries to compare risks using assignments of a 
monetary price as a common measure for their severities: 
In a typical CBA, two or more options in a 
public decision are compared to each oth-
er by careful calculation of their respective 
consequences. These consequences can be 
different in nature, e.g. economic costs, risk 
of disease and death, environmental dam-
age etc. In the final analysis, all such con-
sequences are assigned a monetary value, 
and the option with the highest value of 
benefits minus costs is recommended or 
chosen [...] Cost-benefit analysis is contro-
versial and has repeatedly been subject to 
4 For Thomson, “Now if you cause me an incompensable harm, you cause me a harm which (by definition) no amount of money in 
damages will compensate me” (1986, p. 158). In the same line, for Shrader-Frechette, “If we consider Judith Jarvis Thomson’s notion of 
‘incompensable harms,’ harms so serious that no amount of money could possibly compensate the victims (e.g., for a loss of a species 
or habitat), then it appears that extinction and death, at least, are obviously ‘incompensable harms’” (1991, p. 115).
5 For Baron and Spranca (1997), “Protected values are those that resist trade-offs with other values, particularly economic values. 
We propose that such values arise from deontological rules concerning action. People are concerned about their participation in trans-
actions rather than just with the consequences that result. This proposal implies that protected values, defined as those that display 
trade-off resistance, will also tend to display quantity insensitivity, agent relativity, and moral obligation”.
Renato Rodrigues Kinouchi
238Filosofi a Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 19(3):235-240, sep/dec 2018
severe criticism not least from philosophers. 
Most of this criticism has focused on two 
practices. One of these is the assignment of 
a monetary price to (the loss of) a human 
life. The other is contingent valuation, in 
which the prices of non-market goods such 
as environmental assets are determined by 
asking people what they are willing to pay 
for them (Hansson, 2007, p. 163-164; cf. Es-
pinoza, 2009, p. 130).
Against such criticisms, experts and decision-makers 
tend to argue that cost-benefit analysis permits to estimate 
how much should be  ent in a ions of risk prevention and 
risk management, with the intention of allocating finite re-
sources to minimize harms of different sorts and magnitudes. 
From this point of view, sacred and protected values may be 
of interest to psychologists and philosophers, but “if incompa-
rability is widespread, then what we do in most choice situa-
tions fall outside the scope of pra ical reason” (Chang, 2015, 
p. 206). Cost-benefit analysis takes for granted that values 
under risk can be measured (by means of interval scales) or 
compared (by means of ordinal scales) because without “ac-
curate comparisons in terms of severity, we will not be able 
to perform accurate and cost-effective trade-offs between 
risks and their associated benefits” (Espinoza, 2009, p. 131). 
As stated above, the procedure of comparing values disposed 
into interval or ordinal scales is also taken for granted in sev-
eral other fields of scientific inquiry. Risk analysts just follow 
the same e ablished path, despite the worry on the part of 
some laypersons and philosophers.  
Limitations of standard 
risk assessments
Technological risks are particularly problematic for 
standard risk assessments. The main problem concerns the 
lack of statistical data to estimate the objective probabili-
ty of potential harms. Standard risk assessments have been 
successfully applied to natural catastrophes, occupational 
accidents, shipwrecks and traffic accidents, etc., for which 
there are immense statistical recordings. The potential 
harms of technological innovations cannot be estimated in 
the same way for an obvious reason: they never occurred be-
fore. Risk assessments on technological innovations require 
models based on conditional probabilities subjectively esti-
mated by engineers and risk analysts. Indeed, due to the lack 
of previous statistical data, technological risks are not risks 
properly  eaking, but uncertainties. 
There is voluminous literature on the distinction be-
tween risk and uncertainty according to the type of proba-
bilistic knowledge available. The distinction involves several 
complications which have been extensively discussed in deci-
sion theory, in economics, in statistics and in philosophy (see 
Hájek and Hitchcock, 2016). But besides the type of probabi-
listic knowledge available, the values involved also influence our 
choices. Roughly  eaking, the epistemic uncertainty related to 
our limited probabilistic knowledge comes accompanied by an 
evaluative uncertainty related to our value judgements. Such 
evaluative limitation should not be disregarded in matters such 
as, for example, biotechnological innovations whose large-scale 
side effects can be irreversible (Garcia and Martins, 2009; Lacey, 
2005, 2009; Mariconda, 2014; Martins, 2012). Consider the fol-
lowing passage about risk assessment of transgenic agriculture:
Standard risk assessment has kept some 
potentially harmful varieties of transgenics 
from being marketed. Nevertheless, it is 
unable to address, among other things, (a) 
potential social risks – e.g. monopolization 
of the world’s food supply, undermining the 
conditions for other forms of farming, im-
poverishment and dislocation of small-scale 
farmers – and (b) potential risks to the envi-
ronment occasioned by transgenics in virtue 
of the fact that usually they are commodities 
and integral to current projects of large cor-
porations, and (c) ecological and long-term 
environmental risks that arise because of so-
cial mechanisms, e.g., the failure (or inabili-
ty) of farmers to adhere to regulations that 
are assumed to be in place when judgments 
of risk in practice are based on standard risk 
assessment (Lacey, 2009, p. 853-854).
Lacey has detailed the controversies on transgenics in 
dozens of works, but here I can only briefly outline the gener-
al lines of his argument presented in “The interplay of scien-
tific a ivity, worldviews and value outlooks”. For Lacey, bio-
technologists confine their research within a decontextualized 
approach (DA) in which values related to social well-being 
and environmental safety are excluded and “empirical data 
are selected, sought out [...] and reported using descriptive 
categories that are generally quantitative, applicable in virtue 
of measurement, instrumental and experimental operations” 
(Lacey, 2009, p. 843). Consequently, standard risk assess-
ments tend to focus only “on the quantitative and probabilistic 
study of (anticipated) hazards for health and the environment 
over the relatively short time scale of laboratory and con-
trolled field studies, deploying categories acceptable within 
DA” (Lacey, 2009, p. 853, italics mine). The decontextualized 
approach goes hand in hand with a materialist worldview 
deeply informed by the values of technological progress. Nev-
ertheless, for Lacey, materialism and the values of technolog-
ical progress are insufficient “to justify adopting the decon-
textualized approach virtually to the exclusion of conducting 
research under competing strategies” (Lacey, 2009, p. 851). 
In addition, one may argue that socio-environmental values 
are extremely important and indeed strongly preferable to 
the values of technological progress, up to the point that no 
further benefits from transgenics could balance the risks im-
posed on health and on the environment by their use. In the 
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last years such an argument against transgenics, which evokes 
the precautionary principle, has begun to inform an increas-
ing number of restrictive policies in the European Union.6
I wish to conclude with the suggestion that some addi-
tional light is shed on this issue if we consider that risk analysis, 
like other scientific pra ices, requires the construction of mod-
els which must be assumed to be fictions. Several authors such as 
Cartwright (1983, 1999, 2010), Contessa (2010), Fine (1993), 
Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009), Frigg (2010a, 2010b, 2010c), Leng 
(2001), Morgan (2001), Rahman and Redmond (2015) have 
discussed such approach – usually called fictionalism in philos-
ophy of science7 – according to which “scientific textbooks and 
journal articles abound with passages that appear to be mean-
ingful plain descriptions of physical systems […] but which do 
not describe actual systems and which would not be taken to 
do so by any competent pra itioner in the field” (Frigg, 2010b, 
p. 257, original italics). The analogy between models and fic-
tions is controversial (see Giere, 2009) but, in the context of 
risk analysis, how could we anticipate potential harms without 
constructing risk models which are assumed to be fictions? 
Could we make more realistic experiments intending to know 
the real extent of risky situations? From a descriptive point of 
view, fictionalism does not require from risk analysis more than 
the latter can offer, namely, imaginary risk scenarios. 
More important, however, is the claim that “we will have 
to distort the true picture of what happens if we want to fit 
it into the highly constrained structures of our mathematical 
theories” (Cartwright, 1983, p. 139). For Cartwright, “a model 
is a work of fiction” in the sense that “some properties ascribed 
to objects in the model will be genuine properties of the ob-
jects modelled, but others will be [...] introduced into this 
model as a convenience, to bring the objects modelled into 
the range of the mathematical theory” (Cartwright, 1983, 
p. 153). Specifically concerning standard risk assessments, it 
is important to realize how they are decisively constrained by 
the way in which risk analysts take values into account. Risk 
analysts take for granted some idealized assumptions on value 
measurement, commensurability, and comparability, which 
have been usual in contemporary social sciences and econom-
ics; nevertheless, the point is that those idealized assumptions 
limit the scope of standard risk assessments. So, significant 
potential harms from technological innovations may not be 
anticipated by models/fictions constructed to find out only 
the risks whose severity measures fit in the equations of stan-
dard risk assessments. 
 To regard risk models as fictions does not mean they are 
useless mathematical tools. The intention is to keep in mind 
how deceptive they may be in virtue of the limited range of 
values which they include. The value-ladenness of risk implies 
issues which indeed affect every field of scientific inquiry that 
demands some procedure of value measurement. The models 
used in standard risk assessments are fictions, like other sci-
entific models, in the sense that they take for granted some 
idealized assumptions on values that define which potential 
harms we will anticipate and which ones we will not. This 
is particularly relevant in controversies about technological 
innovations, not only because determining the probability of 
those potential harms is a hard task, but mainly because we 
can fail to evaluate the severity of those harms.  
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